In 2008-2009, the US and the UK undertook quantitative easing to drive interest rates to near zero to combat the Global Financial Crisis, and China increased the growth rate of base money slightly. The resulting credit growth was very slight in US and UK but over 100% in China. The US and UK money multipliers collapsed because the required capital adequacy ratio (CAR) was binding for many of their banks. Specifically, the value of the money multiplier is zero when CAR is not met; is one when CAR is binding and when the asset purchased by the central bank requires the commercial bank to hold capital against it; and equals the reciprocal of the required reserve ratio when CAR is not binding. To improve China's economic performance, we propose three new growth drivers to replace the present instruments of macro-stimulus: changes in rural economic institutions to create new entrepreneurs, an urbanization strategy based on the principle of future home ownership, and modernization of the financial system.
This abrupt decline in the GDP of the major advanced economies translated into a large abrupt negative external shock to China that had two components: a negative export shock, and a negative inward foreign direct investment (FDI) shock, see Figure versus 8.5% for the US, 94.6% versus 17.7% for the UK, and 12.6% versus 11.6% for Chinasee Figure 3 . It seems a puzzle that the markedly more aggressive monetary expansion by the US and the UK was not able to prevent negative GDP growth in 2009. Was the ineffectiveness 7 Many analysts interpret the 8% prediction to mean "at least 8% growth in 2009" because China had always exceeded its government-set growth target since 1978. 8 See, for example, Rogoff (2009) of monetary policy in US and UK more the result of the particular initial structural conditions in these economies or more the result of still inadequate expansion of the monetary base? Our answer is that it was the former.
This paper has two goals. The first goal, which is the primary goal, is to explain why the expansionary monetary policies in USA, UK and China led to the very different outcome in output performance. I will show that the nature of the M0-GDP nexus depends on the condition of the balance sheet of the financial sector before large-scale open-market operations were undertaken to increase M0. The large jump in M0 in US and UK could not stimulate GDP because the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) requirement prevented the normal working of the credit creation process propelled by the required reserves ratio being less than unity. Our identification of the CAR being a constraint on the effectiveness of monetary stimulus is of interest because this point is not discussed in many widely-used intermediate-level textbooks published before 2008 9 even though they all mentioned the importance of monetary factors in the Great Depression of the 1930s. These textbooks focus on the required reserve ratio (RRR) and the currency-deposit ratio (CDR) to as determinants of the size of the money multiplier. Since the RRR is now used less and less in the advanced economies as an instrument to control the growth of credit, it is time to update the usual discussion on money multiplier by including the role of CAR. In short, our first contribution in this paper is to bring attention to the point that the ability of the central bank to impart monetary stimulus depends on the initial conditions in the financial system in a way that is often overlooked.
The second, and secondary, goal of this goal is to argue that China should now replace its present tools of macro-stimulation with new growth drivers because the present macro-stimulus tools will cause inflation in the medium-run and weaken the growth fundamentals in the long-run.
Our second contribution in this paper is to outline a list of new growth drivers that will sustain China's high growth by hastening its convergence to a modern market economy and promoting higher growth in the less developed regions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 spells out the links between the monetary base and the size of the liquidity stimulus. Section 3 shows how subprime mortgage crisis removes the ability of open market purchases of government securities to provide liquidity stimulus. Section 4 matches the discussion in Section 3 with the growth of credit in US, UK and China during the GFC. Section 5 concludes the paper by discussing why China must replace its present macro-stimulus instruments with new ones to avoid problems from the medium-run onward.
The Linkages in the M0-GDP Nexus
We first depict the banking system in a simple way by using the following assumptions:
1. The commercial banking system consists of two banks, Bank A and Bank B.
2. Any commercial loan extended by Bank A will be deposited by the borrower in Bank B;
and vice versa. The balance sheets of the commercial banking system and its two component banks resulting from the above assumptions are displayed in Table 1 . We will use the term "traditional open market purchase" to refer to the central bank buying government securities from the commercial banks, and the term "non-traditional open market purchase" to refer to the central bank buying commercial loans from the commercial banks.
We now show in Table 2 We are now ready to consider the case of a $6 million write-off of subprime mortgage loss by each bank. Part I of Table 3 shows the immediate consequences on the balance sheets:
the value of Bank A's capital is now $7 million, and the value of its total loan portfolio is $97 --yielding a capital-asset ratio of 7%. Unless Bank A and Bank B are able (and willing) to raise more capital, they would have to recall loans or sell them at discount in order to meet the legal CAR of 10%. This economy-wide shedding of loans is likely to ignite a downward spiral for aggregate output: stoppages of production from the non-availability of trade credit would lead to bankruptcies and even lower asset prices, which would require to more write-off of bank capital, necessitating additional shedding of loans.
In The lesson from Table 3 is that when the banking system in violation of the CAR requirement, the value of the money multiplier is 0. The expansion of the monetary base does not stimulate production because the reduced capital position of the banks forces them to hold the new funds as excess reserves and not push them out as new loans. Table 4 reveals an interesting about the consequences of additional non-traditional openmarket operations to boost the economy after the earlier dose has enabled the banks to fulfill the CAR requirement. Similar to the textbook case depicted in Table 2 There is, however, a fundamental qualification to the preceding conclusion from Table 4 .
Its validity depends on more than CAR being binding, it also depends on the condition that the financial asset purchased by the central bank must be one that the commercial bank has to hold capital against. In our Table 4 example, CAR applied to government securities but in many major countries, CAR does not apply to government-issued obligations. In this important class 12 The adjective "large" is appropriate because the original amount of bank reserves is only $20 million.
of countries, open-market purchases of government securities when CAR is binding will not increase bank lending to the private sector. For these countries, the central bank must purchase commercial papers in order to avoid a zero-value money multiplier. This non-traditional mode of open-market purchase is a practice that citizens should rightly worry about because the next step down this slippery slope is for the government to print money and purchase private equities. 
Matching Theory and

Concluding Remarks
A large increase in base money for balance-sheet repair will have different implications for the inflation outlook as the same increase in base money for demand-replacement therapy.
As the former accommodates a portfolio shift towards liquid assets, it is less likely to be To us, the roaring real estate market and the use of non-market means (e.g. ban on purchases) to tame it are symptoms of some deep economic problems that China has to address in order to sustain growth over the long-run. Specifically, the real estate boom is part of a This different understanding is based on the reality that a large part of China's economy is still state-controlled 21 , and that this segment pursues other objectives besides the ideal of profit-maximization. Because state-controlled enterprises (SCEs) are usually bailed out when investment decisions turned out to be over-optimistic or derailed by bad luck, this soft-budget practice has created the well-know interest-inelastic phenomenon of "thirst for investment" which makes the economy inflation-prone; see Woo (2006) . An expanded SCE yields its stateappointed manager three major benefits: higher likelihood of promotion based on the proven 19 The Household Registration System in China defines the legal residence status for every citizen (e.g. rural versus urban, city A versus city B). 20 "Shanghai property curbs soon," China Daily, May 13, 2010. Naturally, the citizenry has responded to the higher costs of buying second homes in creative ways, including temporary divorces, "Divorce, a way round China's second-home restrictions," China Daily, May 13, 2010. 21 State-controlled firms include state-owned firms and publicly-listed firms where the state and its intermediaries hold the controlling share.
ability to handle bigger things, greater patronage power to build a political base; and more resources that could potentially be diverted for personal gains. 22 Equally important is that the leaders of the local governments share the enthusiasm of SCE managers for growth for the same three reasons.
The central government has two lines of defense to maintain macro-stability in China's partially-reformed economy. The first line is that all large projects need the approval of the National Development and Reform Commission (formerly, the State Planning Commission).
The second line of defense is that all banks are assigned credit quotas.
So when Premier Wen Jiabao approved the stimulus program and covered only a third of its cost, he was giving permission, one, to the SCEs to invest more in order to offset the spending slump in the private sector; and, two, to the state-controlled banks (SCBs) to extend the necessary loans to fund the approved projects. Herein lies the mechanism for the success of the stimulus program: the use of non-profit-maximizing state-controlled production and financial units to boost aggregate demand. Because the SCEs and the SCBs are implementing a stateassigned mission, their managers cannot rightly be held responsible should the assigned projects turn out to be financial busts in the future.
Not surprisingly, the public media carries occasional anecdotes about new investments in industries plagued by overcapacity (e.g. steel, cement, and aluminum); trophy investments (e.g. A second common concern about China's stimulus program is that the SCBs were channeling the flood of liquidity to the SCEs and neglecting the increased financing needs of the private sector brought on by the GFC. Pressed for working capital, two well-known large private companies, Rizhao (a steel firm) and Mengniu (a diary), agreed to be acquired by their stateowned counterparts. As SCEs are generally less efficient and innovative than private firms, the expansion of the role of the state firms has rightly raised the issue of whether Premier Wen's way of imparting the needed boost to capacity utilization during the GFC would become a drag on future productivity growth.
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In our opinion, the discussion on China's stimulus program should now turn from the deleterious consequences of the continued administration of Premier Wen's emergency-room medicine to what his post-operative medication should be. We would therefore like to end this paper by proposing three new inter-related growth drivers that would minimize the tradeoff 24 The 51% figure is from combining information in Shih (2010) who reported the debt of the central government to be 20% of GDP, the information in the Financial Times ("China warned of growing 'land loan' threat," March 28, 2010) that the combined figure was 71%. between full utilization of existing production capacity and viable long-term growth of production capacity, and they are (1) creation of more new private entrepreneurs; (2) urbanisation according to the principle of future home ownership; and (3) development of a modern financial system where the private sector has a greatly enhanced role.
The state can partly offset the expanded state sector by mobilising the inland migrant workers (nongmin gong) laid-off from the coastal provinces into an entrepreneurial force. Many of the nongmin gong have sufficient work experience to start their own factory-workshops to take advantage of the increased cost competitiveness of the inland provinces created by the explosive extension of the national transportation network during the GFC. Because the primary barrier to the emergence of this group of owner-operators is the availability of credit, the government should legalize small and medium private banks as they have comparative advantage over the four large state banks in catering to the needs of these new entrepreneurs. 27 Farmland should also be privatized so that the new businesses can have the collateral to access credit from the new private banks. The creation of a new large group of private entrepreneurs will bring three major benefits (1) expenditure by this new group will substitute for the present macrostimulus program in keeping aggregate demand high; (2) private firms are likely to have higher productivity growth than SCEs; and (3) these small and medium private enterprises will be more labour-intensive than SCEs.
The second new growth driver would be urbanization based on the principle of affordable future home ownership. The fast growth of the real estate sector, not only recently but also over the last decade, reflected not just speculative demand but also genuine pent-up demand for housing and genuine accommodation of the high rate of the joint industrialization- 27 The system of prudential supervision must also be strengthened, and interest rate be deregulated. urbanization process. 28 The bulk of the new arrivals from the countryside cannot qualify for bank mortgages, and so many investors have been buying multiple housing units to rent to the new arrivals with the intention of raising the rents over time in line with the income growth of the renters. In this sense, much of the recent housing demand has been speculative.
We propose that China studies the low-cost public housing schemes in Hong Kong and Singapore and establishes a national housing program where the new arrivals would rent homes for seven years and then have the first right to buy these units at a price based on construction costs. This "future ownership" form of urbanization would prevent the problem of empty housing held for speculative reasons from escalating into NPLs. China can afford a massive public housing program because the expensive part of such programs in other countries is the cost of land and not the cost of the structures, and land in China is mostly owned by the state.
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Our proposed form of urbanisation will support China's growth in three ways (1) the maintenance of real estate investment to supply the needed housing and to help maintain existing level of aggregate demand; (2) the redirection of bank loans to new rural migrants, with the new housing agency as the intermediary, to prevent the appearance of NPLs; and (3) this housing scheme will redistribute income to the rural migrants (which helps in reducing the threat of software failure), with the positive side effect that consumption would rise to help offset the elimination of the macro-stimulus program. development of the first new growth driver: privatization of farmland, termination of the household registration system, and liberalization of the financial system.
The legalization of private banks is not just lubricant to allow the smooth working of the first two new growth drivers, it is also an independent growth driver in its own right. The GFC has greatly increased attention on the chronic imbalances in global trade and incited strident justifications for US protectionism against China's "beggar-thy-neighbour" policies. 30 The prevention of foreign protectionism through financial sector modernization is our third new growth driver for China.
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Because China's trade account surplus is largely caused by the difference between its savings and investments 32 , it has become fashionable to call for China to adopt consumption-led growth by reducing savings and by reducing investments. 33 We note, however, that (1) this adjustment recipe of a lower investment rate is actually a call for China to grow slower and delay its economic catch-up with the advanced economies; (2) what is truly economically unnatural, is for China to have been putting its savings abroad when the rate of return on domestic investment is so much higher than the rate of return on US Treasury securities; and (3) China's "over- 30 See, for example, Krugman (2010a and 2010b); Wolf (2010) ; " Currency Dispute Likely to Fray US-China Ties," The New York Times, February 4, 2010; and the hard-hitting editorial "Will China Listen?" The New York Times, March 17, 2010. See Woo (2008) for a detailed discussion on the causes of US-China trade tensions 31 There are also, of course, the traditional ways that financial sector modernization would help drive economic growth. The emergence of a strong small-medium banking sector will reduce the dominance of the state-controlled banks and hence make the economy less vulnerable to their collapse from potential NPLs. The entry of private banks (domestic and foreign) will reduce the probability of any one of the big four state banks would remain too big to fail, and hence reduce the soft-budget protection enjoyed by the now monopoly state banking system. The privatisation of some units of the SCBs, and the emergence of large domestic private banks will also help in strengthening the budget constraints perceived by the managers of SCBs. The development of a modern banking system with a major role for the private sector will thence increase the quality of bank loans along with the increase in the quantity of bank loans -helping to reduce the appearance of NPLs along with market-directed investments replacing the macro-stimulus program. 32 This is from the GNP identity where the current account balance is the sum of (nongovernmental savingsnongovernmental investments) and (government revenue -government expenditure).
savings" could just as accurately be described as China's "under-investment." So, the true cause of China's chronic trade surpluses is the inability of China's financial system to intermediate all of domestic savings into domestic savings 34 , and the best cure is to eliminate this dysfunctional aspect by modernizing the financial system by freeing up entry to private financial institutions, both foreign and domestic. 35 We end by noting that the above three new growth drivers will not only obviate the employment-growth tradeoff of the present macro-stimulus but also improve the regional distribution of growth, create a more labor-intensive pattern of growth, forestall protectionism against China's exports, and raise investment (and, hence, growth). 
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